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Epistemic Injustice and Illness
IAN JAMES KIDD & HAVI CAREL
ABSTRACT This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary
healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimo-
nial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their
care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker’s account of epis-
temic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and
identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that
generate them. We claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons espe-
cially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. We end by proposing ﬁve avenues
for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.
Without the narrative acts of telling and being heard, the patient cannot con-
vey to anyone else – or to self – what he or she is going through. More radi-
cally and perhaps equally true, without these narrative acts, the patient cannot
himself or herself grasp what the events of illness mean.1
1. Introduction
A study published in 1984 found that the average amount of time between a patient
beginning to speak and the doctor’s ﬁrst interruption was eighteen seconds. Of sev-
enty-four ofﬁce visits recorded, only in seventeen (23%) was the patient allowed to
complete his or her opening statement of concerns. The authors concluded that this
premature interruption of patients resulted in a loss of relevant information.2 We sug-
gest that this ﬁnding is characteristic of a certain epistemic stance that tacitly incorpo-
rates presumptions about the capacities of patients to provide relevant information in
healthcare contexts, and which is both epistemically unjustiﬁed and epistemically
unjust.
We thus propose, in this article, to examine epistemic injustice within healthcare in
the developed world. We focus on this type of healthcare in order to avoid making
generalisations about other types of healthcare and in order to describe the problem in
its simpler form. We note, however, that the issue described here may be prevalent
elsewhere and intersect with additional problems existing in other healthcare systems.
Two broad forms of epistemic complaints reliably arise within contemporary health-
care practice. The ﬁrst are what one might call patient complaints, those made by ill
persons and especially by those with prolonged and involved experience of modern
healthcare, such as the chronically ill. These typically take the form of reports that
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healthcare professionals do not listen to their concerns, or that their reportage about
their medical condition is ignored or marginalized, or that they encounter substantive
difﬁculties in their efforts to make themselves understood to the persons charged with
their diagnosis and treatment.
The second are physician complaints, understood broadly as those offered by health-
care professionals. They often complain that patients provide medically irrelevant
information, make odd statements and superﬂuous remarks about their condition, or
otherwise fail to contribute epistemically to the collection of medical data. Taken
together, a difﬁcult epistemic situation emerges in which neither group can engage in
effective testimonial and hermeneutical relations with the other.
Two features of these epistemic complaints are worth noting. The ﬁrst is that they
tend to have the consequence of complicating – and, in certain cases, compromising –
the epistemic relationship between ill persons and the healthcare professionals charged
with their care. Such breakdowns in relationship have a range of practical conse-
quences, including the unwillingness or inability of ill persons to give complete or
accurate reports of their symptoms and adherence to treatment, which in turn can cre-
ate a need for additional tests or further referral. The practical consequences of such
behaviours can include the jeopardising of the ill person’s treatment and signiﬁcant
costs for the healthcare system when important information is overlooked. Moreover
such breakdowns in the epistemic relationship can result in ill persons having negative
subjective experiences of healthcare, such that they might come to associate hospitals
not only with sickness and suffering, but also with confusion and isolation.
The second feature of these epistemic complaints is that they are systematic and
longstanding features of healthcare systems, rather than isolated or incidental cases of
communicative failure in otherwise epistemically harmonious systems. An abundant
body of empirical evidence indicates that the epistemic complaints described are not
anomalous but rather indicators of serious and persistent problems that arguably arise
from contingent structural features of contemporary healthcare practice, but which
could be addressed through systematic reform. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, pae-
diatrician Barbara M. Korsch published an inﬂuential series of papers identifying ‘gaps
in doctor-patient communication’. Based on interviews with patients, she identiﬁed
the causes of these ‘gaps’ being the ‘coldness’ associated with impersonal diagnostic
procedures, doctors’ perceived indifference to or ignorance of the concerns of their
patients, and a disorientating use of medical jargon.3
Korsch’s work was followed by further studies of the personal and social experiences
of ill persons, by authors such as Arthur Kleinman and S. Kay Toombs, and has also
inspired recent work in phenomenological pathography.4 Such concerns have also
directly informed subsequent legislative changes to healthcare policy, such as the NHS
Patient Charter and the NHS constitution in the UK.5 But despite this greater aware-
ness, patients continue to voice epistemic concerns, most obviously through the vast
body of pathographic literature – including online patient fora, blogs, and narratives –
which consistently attest to persistent experiences of feeling ignored, marginalized, or
epistemically excluded by health professionals.6 The UK Patients’ Association, for
instance, lists complaints about communication between patients and health profes-
sionals as a frequent complaint received by the association.7 Although much of this lit-
erature focuses upon the emotional distress that such negative experiences generate,
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we think that they are grounded in an epistemic dimension that has not, until now,
been fully identiﬁed.
Contemporary commentators have connected these epistemic complaints with their
fears about a wider ‘crisis’ in modern medicine and to related calls for a ‘humanistic
turn’ in medical care.8 Often the crisis and the calls for reform play upon and invoke
distinctively epistemological concerns about the capacity of physicians to initiate and
sustain rich testimonial and hermeneutical relationships with patients. Indeed, many
medical policymakers have begun to issue calls for a restructuring of medical training
and practice whose explicit aim is to ameliorate the communicative problems that arise
between patients and physicians.9
In 2012, Darrell G. Kirch, the president of the Association of American Medical
Colleges, announced an ambitious reform of the Medical Career Aptitude Tests
(MCAT). From 2015, American medical students are required to study ethics, philos-
ophy, and cultural studies so that they can cultivate and reﬁne their capacities to
understand and engage with the concerns and experiences of their patients. As Kirch
writes, ‘being a good physician is about more than scientiﬁc knowledge’, for it involves
‘understanding people’, thereby requiring that doctors have ‘communication skills,
and an ability to interact with people with empathy [and] integrity’ – a clear testimony
to the need to respond to the epistemic complaints noted above.10 It is therefore clear
that the two sets of epistemic problems we identiﬁed reﬂect systematic features of
modern healthcare that are of signiﬁcant concern to patients, practitioners, and policy-
makers.
Other recent developments in attitudes to healthcare, mainly in the United States
and United Kingdom, such as the growth of ‘narrative medicine’, are also inter-
pretable as responses to those epistemic problems; however, typically the epistemologi-
cal issues that generate the problems are neither recognised nor addressed. An
example is the increasing emphasis placed upon ‘communication skills’ that doctors
ought to exercise, which tend to focus on superﬁcial modiﬁcations of physical beha-
viour – such as adopting an open posture and making eye contact. Such measures
arguably fail to identify and challenge the deeper epistemic inequalities that charac-
terise the relationship between patients and physicians. The use of reductive and sim-
plistic questionnaires to glean information about ‘patient satisfaction’ is another such
example, in which opinions are sought, but only in a conﬁned and predeﬁned form
that is sensitive only to measurable and schematised variables of patient experience.
Although such skills, initiatives, and policies should be welcomed as efforts to repair
the epistemic relationship between patients and physicians, they tend to rely upon
highly contestable epistemological presuppositions. For instance, they tend to neglect
the fact that those relationships are usually characterised by epistemic inequality and
asymmetric power relations in a way that upsets comfortable hopes about the efﬁcacy
of superﬁcial behavioural changes by physicians. Being physically or mentally unwell,
dependent on others for pain relief, bedbound, or incontinent – all of these place the
patient in a position of vulnerability and dependence which erodes their social and
epistemic conﬁdence and capacities.11 We claim that concerns about patient-physician
relationship, the efﬁcacy of medical care, and public trust in medicine can be usefully
reframed in terms of fundamental epistemological problems. If so, one should expect
epistemology to play an essential role in the diagnosis and treatment of these
problems.
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The aim of this article is therefore to provide an epistemological analysis of these
problems using Miranda Fricker’s notion of ‘epistemic injustice’.12 We make two
claims, the ﬁrst being that chronically ill persons are especially vulnerable to epistemic
injustice, owing to prevalent negative stereotypes of illness and certain structural fea-
tures of contemporary healthcare practice.
The second claim is that the concept of epistemic injustice can therefore help to
explain, at least to some degree, patients’ complaints about their healthcare experi-
ences. Since ill persons already encounter a range of difﬁculties, offering new explana-
tory and ameliorative resources is an essential task, and one to which applied
epistemology can contribute.
In addition, there are particular constraints that restrict patients’ ability to describe
their illness experience, and hence to provide their own account of the clinical
encounter. These will be discussed below as a form of hermeneutical injustice, and we
have also discussed them elsewhere.13 Although this is not the focus of this article, we
note that the two phenomena – epistemic injustice and communicative constraints –
intersect in signiﬁcant ways in the case of illness.
Before beginning the analysis two caveats are needed. First, our claim is not that ill
persons are always epistemically reliable, for that is clearly not the case. Certain cases
of illness – such as certain brain injuries, dementia, and psychosis – result in severe
cognitive impairment that will necessarily erode a person’s epistemic reliability. Our
claim is that judgments about the epistemic credibility of ill persons are too often prej-
udicial and generated and sustained by negative stereotypes and structural features of
healthcare practice. Many patients will not be as well placed as their doctors to under-
stand certain aspects of their illness and treatment, but this neither requires nor justi-
ﬁes the further attribution to those patients of inferior epistemic status tout court.
Second, our focus in this article will primarily be on the chronically ill, and so our
references to ‘the ill’ should be understood as referring to the fairly stable social group
of persons with chronic somatic illnesses and their associated stigma. Our aim here is
to secure the claim that this speciﬁc sub-group of ill persons can and does suffer epis-
temic injustice. We leave questions about speciﬁc and complex cases – for example,
about how our analysis might apply to mental illness, patients who are children, and
acute illness – for further work.14
2. Epistemic Injustice, Prejudice and Stereotypes
The concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ was introduced by Miranda Fricker to refer to
forms of injustice that are ‘a wrong done to someone speciﬁcally in their capacity as a
knower’.15 Since the social and epistemic practices of giving information to others and
interpreting our experiences is integral to our rationality, identity, agency and dignity,
it is evident that injustice which harms our testimonial and hermeneutical capacities
will be a source of deep harm. In her book, Fricker focuses on epistemic injustices that
arise from cases of racial and sexual stereotyping and prejudice, such as cases where a
speaker’s testimony is accorded a lower degree of credibility owing to their being black
or a woman, than they would if hearing the testimonies of a white male. Fricker goes
on to claim that the damage resulting from epistemic injustice impacts upon a person’s
life as a whole, and so ramiﬁes with more familiar forms of social injustice. If so,
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epistemic injustice is integrally related to social injustice.16 We suggest that there are
distinctive features of the social group of ill persons that render them vulnerable to
similar forms of negative prejudices and stereotypes, such that Fricker’s account of
epistemic injustice can also be applied to them.
There are several varieties of epistemic injustice, but for reasons of space and focus,
our analysis focuses on the two identiﬁed by Fricker, namely testimonial injustice and
hermeneutical injustice, which arise in the context of our testimonial and hermeneutical
practices. We also discuss two speciﬁc forms of testimonial injustice, which Christo-
pher Hookway dubs participatory prejudice and informational prejudice, each of which
involve a person or group facing obstacles to their participation in collective epistemic
activities.17 The relationship of these two prejudices to testimonial injustice is a matter
of debate among virtue epistemologists, with Fricker herself arguing that testimonial
injustice is ‘the most basic’ form of epistemic injustice, of which the two prejudices
identiﬁed as Hookway are speciﬁcations.18 We agree, so the article starts with testimo-
nial injustice, moves onto the two prejudices, before turning to hermeneutical injus-
tice. In each case, we ask whether ill persons are especially vulnerable to that type of
injustice, and if so, identify the stereotypes, structures, and practices that generate and
sustain it.
Illness often leads to incapacitation, anxiety, and insecurity; these can either be met
with empathy and compassion, or may trigger negative stereotyping. Instead of making
an empirically and reﬂectively robust judgment on a case-by-case basis of the epis-
temic credibility of an ill person, health professionals (and others) may tacitly fall back
upon such uncritically (and often unconsciously) adopted stereotypes, many of which
incorporate negative epistemic prejudices.
Fricker emphasises that such stereotypes and prejudices typically operate ‘without
any focused awareness’ and are ‘(typically) culpably resistant to the evidence’, and
thus irrational.19 Many prevailing stereotypes of ill persons tend to connote incapacita-
tion, disability, diminished agency, social vulnerability, psychological fragility, and
bodily failure, among others.20 These stereotypes often portray illness in terms of
moral or conative failure or social defect that may ‘contaminate its surroundings’21
and range from moralistic forms through to the ‘punitive and sentimental’ types
described by Susan Sontag.22 A broad theme of these stereotypes is, as Arthur Frank
remarks, that ‘the power of stigma has fed on seeing the body’s condition as an
expression of morality’,23 such that the fact of illness is a mark of moral, social, and
epistemic failure.
The structures of healthcare institutions are underpinned by biomedical approaches
that focus upon the biological rather than existential aspects of illness, and therefore
lower the level of attention paid to the subjective experience of being ill. Healthcare
provision is based upon principles of efﬁciency (and in some cases ﬁnancial proﬁt)
and designed to suit the needs of health specialists rather than patients. In addition,
time pressure, short consultations, and use of standardised protocols that leave little
room for personal needs and values, are also core features of modern healthcare
systems.
Finally, work is task-based rather than patient-focused, thereby closing down oppor-
tunities for establishing sustained contact between a particular health professional and
an individual patient, and for the rich forms of communicative relationship that might
facilitate the recognition and cultivation of patients’ ability to contribute to the
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epistemic aspects of their care. As we argue below, all of these can contribute in a
myriad of ways to the gradual erosion of the epistemic conﬁdence and capacities of
the ill person.
3. Testimonial Injustice
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deﬂated level of
credibility to the speakers’ word.24 Speciﬁcally, a negative stereotype introduces preju-
dices that cause a credibility deﬁcit with the consequence that a person’s capacity to act
as a testiﬁer – a reliable giver of information – is impaired, or in severe cases com-
pletely destroyed. Fricker emphasises that stereotypes and prejudices are neutral, partly
because they can be benign and sometimes advantageous, and partly because they
serve an essential pragmatic cognitive and social role. The concern about testimonial
injustice arises when a person or group are subjected to a ‘negative identity-prejudicial
stereotype’ which involves a disparaging association between a social group and one or
more attributes, and is closely connected to ethically objectionable investment such as
disdain for the relevant social group.25
A typical case of testimonial injustice could involve negative stereotypes of a particu-
lar race or gender as suffering inferior cognitive capacity and a presumed predilection
for deception, such that their epistemic credibility is automatically downgraded. Such
injustices can be incidental, if the stereotype is weak or the prejudices susceptible to
challenge, or they can be systematic, especially if, as in the case of racism and sexism,
the stereotypes and prejudices are deeply entrenched in the social world. In the latter
case, the social group may suffer a ‘tracker prejudice’, as the prejudices imposed by
the negative stereotype tracks them through different domains of the social world.26
A person or social group suffers from testimonial injustice when a negative identity-
prejudicial stereotype lowers their credibility in one of two ways. The ﬁrst is that the
person or group suffers a loss of testimonial authority owing to a credibility deﬁcit,
especially in relation to other socially and epistemically dominant groups who might
enjoy a corresponding credibility excess. The second is that the person or group will
gradually lose their epistemic conﬁdence as they endure the constant erosion of their
credibility, which may, with time and repetition, crush their conﬁdence in their epis-
temic capacities. A person or group suffering from such a situation will not expect
what they say to be heard, and in time might not speak at all, as the constant assault
upon their testimonial practices gradually undermines their epistemic and social
conﬁdence.27
The question is whether ill persons are especially vulnerable to testimonial injustice
as Fricker describes it; our answer is that they are. For ill persons are often subjected
to one or more of a range of negative stereotypes, which, though diverse, often include
attributions which tend to undermine their epistemic competence and capacities.
These include the stereotypical description of ill persons as cognitively impaired or
emotionally compromised, owing either to their somatic condition or their psychologi-
cal reactions to it (mutatis mutandis for psychiatric illness); or as existentially unstable,
gripped by anxieties about mortality and morbidity such that they ‘cannot think
straight’; or that they will be psychologically dominated by their illness in a way that
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warps their capacity to accurately describe and report their experiences (e.g. ‘the moa-
ner’ or ‘the drama queen’ stereotype).
Such negative stereotypes will therefore tend to prejudicially deprive ill persons of
the prerequisites of reliable epistemic conduct, such as cognitive capacity and psycho-
logical stability, and also attribute to them characteristics – like intensiﬁed emotionality
– that are usually (and contentiously) supposed to be opposed to rationality and relia-
bility.28 The consequence of this negative stereotyping is that patients’ testimonies are
unjustly accorded lower degrees of epistemic credibility than they otherwise would. A
further consequence is that the testimonies that would ordinarily indicate testimonial
reliability are interpreted as irregular or atypical – that one ‘got them on a good day’,
say – thereby further skewing the evaluative engagement of those ill persons.
Consider the following account:
I had an abnormal cervical smear, so was sent to the large city teaching hospi-
tal for a coloscopy. I changed into the usual ties-up-the-back gown, with the
usual vital ties missing, and then went through for the examination. It’s a bit
uncomfy but I was ok. Lots of big sighs from the consultant with his head
between my legs. Then off he goes, leaving the room. I’m told to follow. So I
arrive, naked under a gown which doesn’t do up, slightly damp between the
legs and a bit stressed as I have to sit down and I’m worried about leaving a
wet patch. He goes on to tell me I need an operation. I hear blah-blah-blah
as I’m perching and panicky. And it’s very difﬁcult to think without your
pants on. I said nothing.29
More generally one can identify features of contemporary healthcare practice that can
encourage and entrench the testimonial injustice that ill persons experience. Working
under constant time pressure, routinisation of tasks, and shift work all undermine
opportunities to listen at length to what patients say and to create a relationship with
them. Excessive formality of medical discourse, even when conversing with patients,
and emphasis on professionalization hamper human interaction and may limit ways of
listening. Indeed, the deleterious implications of these features have been recognised
and discussed in literature on the design and reform of healthcare services, evident for
instance in the great emphasis now placed on the solicitation and inclusion of ‘patient
perspectives’.30
Yet both formal surveys and anecdotal evidence suggests that patient complaints
persist and levels of dissatisfaction remain considerable.31 A constant feature of those
complaints is the failure of health professionals to evince desired testimonial sensibili-
ties, and their consequently being perceived by patients as cold, impersonal, or dismis-
sive. Ill persons are therefore demonstrably vulnerable to testimonial injustice because
entrenched features of the social and medical world incorporate a variety of negative
stereotypes of ill persons that sustain prejudices that impose credibility deﬁcits.
If ill persons are vulnerable to testimonial injustice, as we argue, there is still the
question of the nature of the primary epistemic harm they suffer. Fricker characterises
that harm in terms of objectiﬁcation, but more recently Gaile Pohlhaus has suggested
that it is more fully understood in terms of truncated subjectivity.32 Pohlhaus argued
that the ‘primary harm of testimonial injustice’ should be deﬁned as ‘being relegated
to the role of epistemic other, being treated as though the range of one’s subject
capacities is merely derivative of another’s’. More fully,
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. . .unlike a subject (and more like an object), she is not seen as capable of
contributing to epistemic practices uniquely, that is, from her own distinct
lived experience in the world. Consequently, her epistemic labor contributes
to the community via which epistemic interests are pursued, but she is not
permitted to contribute in ways that would redirect epistemic practices toward
those parts of her experienced world that extend beyond or trouble the verac-
ity of the dominantly experienced world. Any contribution that might do so is
summarily denied epistemic support and uptake by dominant members of the
community.33
This seems right to us. Patients seem to occupy the position of ‘other’ in Pohlhaus’
sense, in that their testimony is regularly solicited and indeed essential (e.g. in report-
ing symptoms or side effects of a drug), but nonetheless they remain a ‘derivatised
subject’, i.e. a subject whose capacities are reduced to attending only to what stems
from the other’s perspective.34 Patient testimonies are sought as sources of factual
information, but testimony about the lived experience of illness and the clinical
encounter, which may challenge the medical view, is often excluded from considera-
tion and plays no formal role in decision-making and service design (at least until very
recently). Thus, in cases of testimonial injustice, patients are perceived as ‘somewhere
between an epistemic subject and object’.35 This intersects with other types of objecti-
ﬁcation patients encounter in a medical setting, for example, the objectiﬁcation of
their bodies.36
Pohlhaus’ account accurately captures the epistemic plight of many ill persons in
healthcare contexts: ﬁrst, they are afforded limited capacities to epistemically con-
tribute, usually by providing factual information, but not by offering their distinctive
lived experiences. Second, their epistemic labour contributes to the epistemic practices
of healthcare systems but they are not permitted to contribute in ways that redirect the
interests or concerns of those systems. These two points can only be uncovered by an
epistemic analysis; this shows both the theoretical efﬁcacy and practical signiﬁcance of
such an analysis, which can open the way to reforming healthcare practices. The epis-
temic analysis can also be usefully connected with philosophical work in the phe-
nomenology of illness, which aims to enable patients to order, discern and describe
the experience of illness, which is often confusing, painful and difﬁcult to communi-
cate.37 Both empowering patients’ epistemic practices and tackling epistemic injustice
by combating negative stereotypes are required.
4. Participatory and Informational Prejudice
Testimonial injustice occurs in cases of prejudicial credibility deﬁcit. These can occur
during our social-epistemic interactions with others, as in the cases that Fricker focuses
upon in her book. But, as Christopher Hookway observes, such deﬁcits can actually
begin even before one gets as far as epistemic interaction with others. Speciﬁcally, he
identiﬁes two types of prejudice that can impair a person’s ability to engage in shared
epistemic activities. Since any such activities will involve the (attempted) giving of
information, we agree with Fricker that they ought to be considered as speciﬁc forms
of testimonial injustice.38
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The starting point for these prejudices is the fact that our participation in shared
epistemic practices, such as debating or enquiring, is necessarily premised upon cer-
tain presuppositions about our epistemic peers. These presuppositions take the form
of implicit or explicit expectations about the sorts of capacities and dispositions that
our epistemic peers should typically exhibit. Hookway focuses on two presuppositions.
First, that participants will have a sense of relevance, a capacity to determine which ideas
are worth taking seriously, which objections are meritorious, and so on. A person who
lacks a sense of relevance is likely to undermine the efﬁciency of any epistemic com-
munity they participate in by failing to properly judge the relevance of both their own
contributions and those of others. Second, that our participants have a capacity to pro-
vide information that can meaningfully contribute to the epistemic task at hand, for
instance to provide factual corroboration or correction, or to have sufﬁcient back-
ground knowledge of the subject being debated. Hookway identiﬁes two forms of epis-
temic prejudice attached to these two presuppositions which, when grounded in
negative prejudicial stereotypes, have as their consequence the exclusion of certain per-
sons and groups from participation in shared epistemic activities.
The ﬁrst of these is participatory prejudice, which occurs when a person or group is
prejudicially judged to lack capacities required for having a sense of relevance, and hence
as not being suitable participants for collective epistemic activity. Hookway offers the
example of the epistemic practice of questioning: when a person offers a question for
consideration it must be appraised and this appraisal will affect the epistemic career of
that question. A question that is positively appraised may be taken as relevant and
insightful, to be taken seriously and therefore to be accepted as a basis for further dis-
cussion and action. By contrast, a question may be negatively appraised, perhaps by
being judged to be irrelevant or ill-formed, and so ignored and derogated and thus
excluded from further epistemic consideration. The consequence of a negative apprai-
sal is not only that the question is not taken up as a basis for further epistemic activity,
but also that the questioner and the speciﬁc concerns, interests, and standpoints that
motivate the question are likewise excluded. A question is, after all, typically asked
because the questioner wants to raise awareness of certain issues, affect the agenda of
a discussion, or correct the obliviousness of their peers to certain standpoints.
Certain negative prejudices can therefore manifest as participatory prejudices
because their social and epistemic consequence is that one is prevented from ‘recog-
nising [a potential participant] in debate or discussion’.39 In such cases, a well-placed
concern with epistemic efﬁciency is compromised and corrupted by being placed in
the service of an epistemic prejudice, which is often unconscious.
We think that ill persons are vulnerable to participatory prejudice for at least two
related reasons. The ﬁrst is that ill persons may be supposed to lack the training and
experience needed for the possession of a robust sense of relevance required if one is
to make meaningful contributions to the epistemic practices of medicine. Since ill per-
sons generally lack medical training they may be judged to lack the prerequisites for a
sense of relevance in medical contexts. This judgment relies upon the implicit co-deﬁ-
nition of a sense of relevance with medical expertise, but this structurally excludes the
overwhelming majority of ill persons from potential possession of a sense of relevance.
If so, then this form of participatory prejudice would be a structural feature of contem-
porary healthcare practice. Moreover, what is intensely relevant to the ill person may
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be medically minor (e.g. incontinence) and vice versa, further adding to the sense of
the irrelevance of the patient contributions.
The second reason ill persons are vulnerable to participatory prejudice is that they
are typically regarded as the objects of the epistemic practices of medicine rather than
as participants in them. For instance, a patient’s participation may be conﬁned to con-
ﬁrming basic biographical details or reporting symptoms. If one’s stance towards a cer-
tain social group incorporates the perception of them as providers of information in
this minimal sense, then it will be difﬁcult for one to regard them as participants in a
more epistemically substantive sense.
The second prejudice that Hookway identiﬁes is informational prejudice. It occurs
when a person or group is prejudicially judged to lack the ability to provide informa-
tion relevant in a given context and hence as being an unsuitable participant in collec-
tive epistemic activity. This sort of prejudice can arise in two mutually reinforcing
ways. First, it may appear as a refusal to concede the relevance or signiﬁcance of the
information being offered by a particular individual or group. This is especially liable
to occur in cases where the type of information in question is not reﬂected in or recog-
nised by the experience of the dominant social group. An epistemically dominant
group may therefore refuse to concede that certain forms of information (such as qual-
itative reports of illness experiences) are relevant and signiﬁcant to the epistemic task
at hand, and therefore prevent it from informing the established epistemic practices;
this also rules out the possibility of that information prompting reform of those
practices.
Second, informational prejudice may appear as a refusal to consider presuppositions
about the signiﬁcance and types of information that are legitimate and admissible. An
epistemic community will typically operate with a range of informational presupposi-
tions for legitimate practical and cognitive reasons. Informational prejudice can arise
when the members of that community refuse to periodically reconsider those presup-
positions, especially in the face of vigorous and sustained calls by groups who argue
for the signiﬁcance of other forms of information. The decision to reassess those infor-
mational presuppositions is difﬁcult to make and to follow through, due partly to the
difﬁculties facing reform of foundational commitments. Hookway argues that because
the excluded forms of information do not inform current practice it will generally be
the case that an informational lacuna can only be detected from the ‘participant per-
spective’.40 This reﬂects the broader fact that the absence of social and epistemic
resources can often only be identiﬁed and appreciated by those marginalized individu-
als and communities who suffer from their absence – a core sentiment of standpoint
epistemology.41
We think that ill persons are vulnerable to informational prejudice in the two ways
described. Ill persons are subject to refusals to concede the relevance of the types of
information that they typically offer, such as information concerning their sense of
bodily estrangement or worries about social isolation. Such information is not widely
integrated into modern healthcare practice, and when it is, it tends to be classiﬁed as
‘subjective’, ‘non-medical’, and often does not trigger action.
Ill persons are also subject to refusals to consider the possible signiﬁcance of the
forms of information that are being excluded, for instance by accepting that existential
changes that accompany experiences of illness are important. It is well documented
that despite persistent and often poignant testimonies from ill persons, psychologists,
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philosophers, and phenomenologists, the epistemic norms of medicine remain focused
on quantitative and ‘objective’ forms of information.42
The persistence of structural informational prejudice also has important implications
for the possibilities of reforming modern healthcare practices and institutions to
address the epistemic problems described here. Efforts to design medical interventions
without appropriate consultation with patients may result in healthcare systems that
are not only epistemically unjust but also practically inefﬁcient because a rich range of
forms of information required for the genuine improvement of services is structurally
excluded. We therefore suggest that the achievement of epistemically just healthcare
practices and institutions requires the revision of underlying epistemic presuppositions
and a strong epistemic pluralism that incorporates the informational contributions of
patients.
Participatory and informational prejudices are related to and exacerbated by many
of the social and historical factors that shape modern healthcare systems. Many of
these factors have already been discussed – including the professionalization of
medicine and the prevalent negative stereotypes of ill persons – but others present
themselves. These include the practical pressures upon healthcare practitioners to
meet targets and performance indicators, which impose strict limits upon the dura-
tion and type of informational exchanges between patients and physicians. Another
is the typical socialisation of health professionals, in particular physicians, which
encourages them to think of illness in purely physiological terms and to defend
themselves against difﬁcult emotions by emotionally distancing themselves from
certain situations. And ﬁnally, the awareness that taking practical and policy mea-
sures to properly respond to informational and participatory prejudices would require
radical changes in medical education and training, as illustrated by the scale of the
MCAT reforms.
One might argue that the informational and participatory prejudices experienced by
ill persons are perhaps grounded in a much broader tendency within the history of
Western culture and philosophy to locate epistemic authority in persons who are
healthy – as well as white, male, and adult – though there are a few honourable excep-
tions, including Friedrich Nietzsche and Alasdair MacIntyre.43 In several later works,
MacIntyre argued that Western ethical and political philosophies have tended to disre-
gard the fact that the lives of human beings are generally marked by ‘afﬂiction, vulner-
ability, and dependence’, with the consequence that our conceptions of the good life
and of a just society are therefore designed with an idealised image of the moral agent
– independent, rational and autonomous – which obtains only temporarily and incom-
pletely, and only for some. MacIntyre therefore argued that ethical and political
thought ought to be reformed to reﬂect the fact that most persons are, in his phrase,
‘dependent rational animals’.44
We suggest that epistemology would also beneﬁt from a greater recognition of the
fact that the lives of epistemic agents are also characterised by afﬂiction, vulnerability,
and dependence. Study of the epistemic injustices experienced by the chronically ill is
a useful starting point. But such a study ought to focus not only upon the prejudicial
credibility deﬁcits that constitute testimonial injustice discussed so far, but also upon
the second basic type of injustice identiﬁed by Fricker, to which we now turn.
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5. Hermeneutical Injustice
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in collective hermeneutical resources puts
a person or group at unfair disadvantage when making sense of their social experi-
ences. Speciﬁcally, ‘some signiﬁcant area of one’s social experience [is] obscured from
collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective
hermeneutical resource’.45 Certain experiences cannot be understood because of the
absence of the resources needed to understand them, and then to articulate and com-
municate that understanding to others, with the consequence that the person or group
suffers hermeneutical marginalization, which Fricker deﬁnes as ‘unequal hermeneutical
participation with respect to some signiﬁcant area(s) of social experience’.46
The social implications of hermeneutical marginalization arise because our ability to
recognise and respond to the concerns and experiences of others is crucially premised
upon our ability to understand those concerns and experiences by mobilising adequate
hermeneutical resources. If the required resources do not exist, those experiences will
remain obscure in a way that prevents even the most sympathetic social peers to
respond adequately to them. It is for this reason that hermeneutical injustice is struc-
tural and not agential, arising from speciﬁc contingent features of the social world –
such as its educational practices and political arrangements – rather than from the
activities of speciﬁc agents. Indeed, a consequence of hermeneutical injustice is what
Fricker calls cognitive disablement. All members of a society that is structurally
hermeneutically unjust will be impaired in their capacity to understand certain experi-
ences, but the impairment has differential impact.
Fricker offers the example of societies that lack the concept of sexual harassment,
noting that though both the harasser and harassee are cognitively disabled, there is an
obvious sense in which this is to the harasser’s advantage: ‘it suits his immediate pur-
pose, in that it leaves his conduct unchallenged’.47 Indeed, many cases can be offered
in which a particular social group actively beneﬁts from their inability to understand,
and hence take seriously, the experiences of other groups. Bacon’s maxim that knowl-
edge is power is true, but in certain contexts ignorance can also be a source and
means of legitimating power.48
Hermeneutical injustice can arise in at least three ways, the ﬁrst two of which are
identiﬁed by Rebecca Mason.49 She argues that a distinction should be drawn between
dominant and non-dominant hermeneutical resources on the grounds that ‘marginalized
groups can be silenced relative to dominant discourses without being prevented from
understanding or expressing their own social experiences’.50 The ﬁrst way that
hermeneutical injustice can arise is a situation characterised by a global lack of
hermeneutical resources: the required hermeneutical resources do not exist and so are
not available to any person or group within that society, including but not limited to
the speciﬁc social group whose experiences they are. The second way is that a particu-
lar social group has perfectly adequate hermeneutical resources of its own – its mem-
bers can make sense of their experiences – but those resources are not recognised or
respected by the dominant social and epistemic authorities. This group therefore has
non-dominant hermeneutical resources, and so suffers hermeneutical injustice because
the dominant social groups cannot understand their experiences.
We add to this a third way in which hermeneutical injustice can arise, through what
we call epistemic isolation: situations where a person or group lacks the knowledge of,
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or means of access to, particular information; for instance, if they live within a politi-
cally repressive society which forbids access to the necessary sources of information in
order to protect the government’s hegemony (for example, by blocking certain web-
sites, outlawing certain literature, and so on).51 We suggest that ill persons have non-
dominant hermeneutical resources and so suffer from hermeneutic injustice for that
reason; i.e. ill persons can make sense of their experience but these lack the social
recognition and epistemic respect in ways that are detailed below. We suggest that ill
persons are less prone to the ﬁrst and third modes of hermeneutical injustice, although
it remains to be seen in further work whether some areas of illness are subject to a glo-
bal lack of hermeneutical resources.
In the case of illness, hermeneutical injustice arises because the resources required
for the understanding of the social experiences of ill persons are not accepted as part
of the dominant hermeneutical resources. Most ill persons are capable of describing
their experiences in non-expert terms, but such experiences are: a. largely considered
inappropriate for public discussion and b. play little or no role in clinical decision-
making. Such experiences are often considered private, if not shameful, and inappro-
priate for sharing with others. They are also stigmatising (cf. Goffman) and therefore
talking about them can exact a social and personal cost from the ill person (e.g. dis-
closing one’s HIV status can lead to social exclusion in certain groups).52
Ill persons’ accounts are often dismissed as ‘moaning’ or as idiosyncratic experi-
ences shaped by the negative attitudes of the ill person (who is a ‘moaner’ or ‘expects
too much’). And unless subsumed under a formal complaints procedure, such experi-
ences remain largely un-noted by healthcare providers. Such experiences play little
role in the design of clinical services, regulation of service performance, or in the pro-
duction of clinical guidelines. The inherently qualitative nature of such accounts
makes them difﬁcult to quantify and they are hence considered inadmissible evidence
by medical decision-making bodies.53 Recent attempts in the UK to shoehorn the
diversity of illness experiences into the ‘friends and family test’ further reduce the rich-
ness of such experiences to a simple binary question.54
Hermeneutical injustice can arise through two sorts of strategies, deﬁned here as
stable social and epistemic practices which act to prevent the promotion of non-domi-
nant hermeneutical resources. The ﬁrst are strategies of exclusion, which take the form
of excluding a currently hermeneutically marginalized group from the practices and
places where social meanings are made and legitimated, such as professional commit-
tees or legislative bodies. Such exclusion can take different forms, from physical exclu-
sion to subtler forms of epistemic exclusion, such as the procedural insistence upon
the employment of strenuous legal, medical, or academic terminologies and conven-
tions, so as to exclude those who are not members of those groups from participating
in deliberative processes.
The second are strategies of expression, in which a social group is excluded because,
as Fricker argues, its ‘characteristic expressive style [is not] recognized as rational and
contextually appropriate’; if, for instance, adopting an ‘intuitive or an emotional
expressive style means that one cannot be heard as fully rational’.55 If so, the style that
a marginalized group uses in its efforts to make the case for the recognition of its
hermeneutical resources can serve to undermine those very efforts. And this can lead
to a vicious circle of increasing frustration, leading to more extreme styles of expres-
sion, which in turn lead to further epistemic disenfranchisement. Those two strategies
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can, of course, operate simultaneously, pulling in different directions, especially since
hermeneutical marginalization is often allied to wider forms of social exclusion.
The question, then, is whether ill persons are especially vulnerable to hermeneutical
injustice in the sense offered by Fricker. Our suggestion is that they are: ill persons
typically have non-dominant hermeneutical resources that are not recognised or
respected by the epistemically dominant healthcare professions, but which are essential
to the understanding of at least certain aspects of the experience of illness. Ill persons
can be, and often are, victims of strategies of exclusion: they often report that they are
forced to adopt an epistemically marginal role in consultative exercises, or that they
are required to employ the language and conventions which require professional train-
ing and experience, or that their preferred expressive styles are implicitly and deroga-
tively interpreted as irrational (e.g. being labelled a ‘difﬁcult patient’).
Such pejorative judgments of those expressive styles is, in fact, reﬂective of a wider
philosophical prejudice that contrasts rationality and emotionality, thereby encouraging
a sense that reason ought to be expressed coolly and dispassionately.56 This prejudice
is especially apposite to cases of illness because these will typically have an intense and
dramatic impact upon a person’s life and so naturally invite expression in emotive and
anecdotal styles. If so, a person operating with the rationalistic prejudice will unavoid-
ably ﬁnd it difﬁcult to regard the expressive styles that ill persons ﬁnd both natural
and appropriate as properly rational.
These expressive styles may be overtly emotional and moreover display emotions
that are socially unaccepted such as anger and envy. The expression may be nonlinear,
jumping between different events and times, and hence confusing. It may be repeti-
tive, as part of a process of acceptance. Or the expression may centre on themes that
are difﬁcult to accept, such as mortality, pain, and isolation. The new areas of ‘arts
and health’, medical humanities, and music and dance therapies, as well as the phe-
nomenology of illness, have developed as a critical reaction to this set of prejudices,
and aim to elucidate and legitimate varied forms of expression in order to validate ill-
ness experiences. They can be seen as attempts to combat hermeneutical injustice by
providing expressive means to both make sense of and communicate the experience of
illness.
The hermeneutical injustice that ill persons are particularly susceptible to generally
takes the form of a double injury, because the marginalization of their resources and
expressive styles exacerbates the already considerable hermeneutical challenges that ill
persons commonly face. Many experiences of illness tend to evince two hermeneutical
features. The ﬁrst is inarticulacy, the difﬁculty of adequately communicating, sharing,
or ‘getting across’ certain aspects of the experience of illness.57 That is one reason
why ill persons often engage in a search to identify or create novel communicative
resources, such as visual art, ﬁlm, music, poetry, or drama. And this is another reason
for the development of the disciplines and therapies described above.
The second is ineffability, the sense that certain aspects of those experiences cannot
be adequately communicated to others through propositional articulation at all
because understanding is premised upon a person’s having had the requisite bodily
experiences.58 Typical examples of such ineffable experiences that are hermeneutically
accessible only to those who have had the corresponding personal experiences might
include childbirth, participation in violent military conﬂict, extreme or chronic pain,
or ecstatic religious experience.59
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Such experiences of inarticulacy and ineffability are sources of hermeneutical frus-
tration and the development of artistic and other forms of expression can therefore be
understood as attempts to expand and enrich the hermeneutical resources available to
people who have been through such an experience. These efforts and the academic
work carried out under medical humanities, narrative medicine and phenomenology of
illness have made a considerable contribution to the cultural and social legitimacy of
illness experiences, but remain marginal to medical understandings of the correspond-
ing diseases.60
Certain cases of hermeneutical injustice in the context of illness might also take the
form of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. The hermeneutical frustration that ill persons experi-
ence might result in their becoming increasingly emotive, fraught, and tense, such that
they in fact become epistemically unreliable, thereby gradually fulﬁlling the prejudices
inherent in the negative stereotypes that created the initial hermeneutical difﬁculties.
Such cases would see the establishment of self-sustaining gaps in collective hermeneu-
tical resources by depriving those whom they marginalize and impair of the conﬁdence
and capacities to challenge and correct them.
6. Conclusions
This article provided an analysis of the epistemic problems prevalent in modern
healthcare practice by using Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice. We argued that
patient and health professionals’ epistemic complaints can be understood in terms of
one or both of the two basic types of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneuti-
cal injustice, where the former can manifest in the speciﬁc forms of participatory and
informational prejudice. Such injustices are generated and sustained by both negative
stereotypes of ill persons and structural features of modern healthcare practice. It is
plausible to propose that at least certain speciﬁc sub-groups of ill persons are victims
of what Fricker calls ‘persistent and systematic epistemic injustice’.61
Our claim is not simply that patients have the subjective sense that their epistemic
offerings are rejected, but that there is a systematic overlooking of the realm in which
patient testimonies and interpretations carry great epistemic authority, namely, the
lived experience of illness. The simplistic notion that patients all want the same thing
(to get better) and that objective health states correlate well with subjective wellbeing
leads to the epistemic effacing of this realm. Recent literature in health economics,
happiness studies, narrative medicine and health psychology, clearly demonstrates that
patients want many different things and that the relationship between objective health
and subjective wellbeing is complex and ill-understood.62
By opening an epistemic space for the lived experience of illness, an important new
domain of knowledge – and of further epistemic enquiry and changing of the epistemic
balance between patients and health professionals – can be revealed. This will also
supplement the phenomenological study of the experience of illness by articulating the
epistemic dimension of this study, something that has not been done to date. We hope
to do this in a future paper.
Our analysis also offers several further potential avenues for future enquiry that
could both reﬁne our diagnoses of the sources of those epistemic injustices and indi-
cate means for their resolution, of which ﬁve are noted here. First, it is important to
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uncover epistemic injustice in illness because, as with other forms of injustice, recogni-
tion and acknowledgment are the essential ﬁrst steps towards resolution and abolition
– difﬁcult as those may be.
The second is to undertake critical analysis of the range of stereotypes of ill persons
and to identify how distinctive stereotypes engender different forms of epistemic injus-
tice, especially since it seems clear that there is a complex plurality of ‘stereotypes of
the sick’.63
The third is to begin a social-epistemic study of the ways in which epistemic injus-
tices against ill persons are generated and perpetrated, and which might focus upon a
systematic study of the strategies of exclusion and of expression and of the practices
by which the epistemological presuppositions of medical practice are established. Such
a study could begin by considering existing critiques of healthcare with an overt epis-
temic character: an obvious candidate is the concept of ‘medicalization’, whose rela-
tionship to epistemic injustice is, as Alistair Wardrobe argues, both nuanced and
informative.64
The fourth is the application of a ‘phenomenological toolkit’ which draws upon
the resources of existential phenomenology to provide ill persons with the means of
overcoming the inarticulacy and ineffability of their experiences of illness and health-
care practitioners with the hermeneutical resources required for better understanding
those testimonies.65 In a recent paper, Lauren Freeman argues that pregnant women
suffer from epistemic injustice because their epistemically privileged perspective on
their embodied situation is neglected within current healthcare systems. Freeman
concludes that a phenomenological sensitivity to pregnant women’s lived experience
can therefore challenge the epistemic injustices that, she argues, those women
suffer.66
The ﬁfth would be to ask how, if at all, the structures and institutions of contempo-
rary healthcare could be reformed in a way that would minimise their disposition to
generate epistemic injustice, building upon a handful of recent studies exploring the
relationship between epistemic justice and institutions.67
These various avenues for enquiry all indicate not only that epistemologists can
make contributions to the study and resolution of the epistemic problems that are of
such concern to patients, health professionals, and policymakers, but also that they
can correspondingly beneﬁt from engaging with social and institutional epistemic prac-
tices with such an obvious capacity to help or hinder human wellbeing.
Epistemologists will ﬁnd rich examples of the complex epistemic situations and rela-
tions that obtain between particular social groups and structures, as well as new
opportunities to understand how certain virtues, such as epistemic justice, might play
a distinctive role in the healthcare professions. We hope this article will provide both
direction and inspiration for further studies of the epistemic injustices that affect ill
persons.
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